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Background
Decentralization is promoted as a strategy to improve health system performance by bringing decision-making closer to service delivery. Some studies have investigated if decentralization actually improves the health system. However, few have explored the conditions that
enable it to be effective. To determine these conditions, we have analyzed the perspectives
of decision-makers in the Philippines where devolution, one form of decentralization, was
introduced 25 years ago.
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Methods
Drawing from the “decision space” approach, we interviewed 27 decision-makers with an
average of 23.6 years of working across different levels of the Philippine government health
sector and representing various local settings. Qualitative analysis followed the “Framework
Method.” Conditions that either enable or hinder the effectiveness of decentralization were
identified by exploring decision-making in five health sector functions.

Results
These conditions include: for planning, having a multi-stakeholder approach and monitoring
implementation; for financing and budget allocation, capacities to raise revenues at local levels and pooling of funds at central level; for resource management, having a central level
capable of augmenting resource needs at local levels and a good working relationship
between the local health officer and the elected local official; for program implementation
and service delivery, promoting innovation at local levels while maintaining fidelity to
national objectives; and for monitoring and data management, a central level capable of
ensuring that data collection from local levels is performed in a timely and accurate manner.
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Conclusions
The Philippine experience suggests that decentralization is a long and complex journey and
not an automatic solution for enhancing service delivery. The role of the central decisionmaker (e.g. Ministry of Health) remains important to assist local levels unable to perform
their functions well. It is policy-relevant to analyze the conditions that make decentralization
work and the optimal combination of decentralized and centralized functions that enhance
the health system.
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Introduction
Decentralization is a complex process, but it can be described as the transfer of power or
authority over decision-making from higher (e.g. central, federal, or national) to lower levels
(e.g. state, regional, cantonal, district, provincial, municipal, or local) of administration [1–3].
It has been emphasized in many countries typically with an overall aim to improve health system performance. De-concentration, devolution, delegation, and privatization are attempts for
a typology of decentralization [1,2], although in practice their boundaries overlap rather than
clearly distinguish these from one another. This paper focuses on devolution, a type of decentralization where decision-making authority for health services is transferred to lower political
levels, often local governments that are largely independent from the higher level of government [1–4].
The arguments in favor of more decentralization in the health sector include: empowerment of local authorities to make decisions on their own; reducing levels of bureaucracy to
achieve efficiency; better matching of health services with local priorities; promoting innovations in service delivery that address local needs; and enhancing stakeholder participation in
decision-making [3–5]. On the basis of these expected benefits, decentralization has been vigorously promoted in many countries in the last three decades [5].
Has decentralization been effective in achieving the desired reforms? The answer depends
on the context, the specific form of decentralization implemented, the health sector functions
decentralized, and the outcomes measured. Unlike a concrete intervention, decentralization is
rather a process where a standard form does not exist. Given such heterogeneity and a lack of
consensus on outcomes for measuring success, any assessment of its effectiveness in improving
the health system is challenging. Nevertheless, we have previously argued that these limitations
should not be an excuse to abandon the need to assess its effectiveness, given that decentralization continues to be viewed as a strategy for health sector reform [6].
Some of the broader systematic reviews on decentralization of governance of health services
have explored: its effects in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) [7] based on the framework of the six building blocks of health systems [8]; the achievements, challenges, and issues
related to implementing it in Sub-Saharan African countries [9]; and its impacts on healthrelated equity [10]. These reviews report both positive and negative outcomes and suggest the
consideration of other factors required for successful implementation, such as adequate skills
for the local levels taking on the functions [7], political will in the central level to implement
changes [9], and the pre-existing socio-economic context within which decentralization is
placed [10]. On the other hand, other systematic reviews have examined the effectiveness of
decentralizing health service delivery, such as in treatment of MDR-TB patients where treatment success was higher [11], or in providing anti-retroviral therapy for HIV patients where
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loss to follow-up was less [12]. Both papers however recommend further studies to explore the
effectiveness of decentralizing treatment in a range of other settings.

Decision space approach
One framework for analyzing decentralization is the “decision space” approach [13], which
enables analysis of the amount of choice (i.e. wide, moderate, or narrow) transferred from
higher to lower levels, the decisions made at local levels within this granted “space,” and the
effects that these decisions have on the health system. Previously, decision space has been
reported as mostly wide in the Philippines [14], mostly narrow in Ghana [14] and India [15],
almost none in Fiji [16], and moderate or varying in Zambia [14], Uganda [14,17], and Pakistan [18,19]. The studies in Pakistan have suggested that a wide decision space at local levels
may not be enough to improve service delivery unless it is accompanied by building the
capacity of decision-makers who assume the new tasks and by ensuring accountability for the
decisions they make. It is therefore useful for policy to explore effectiveness given multiple configurations of decision space with these dimensions of capacity and accountability [20]. We will
contribute to this endeavor by an examination of health sector devolution in the Philippines.

Devolution in the Philippines
The Philippines is a republic in Southeast Asia comprising >7,600 islands and with a population of 101 million [21]. Government was historically highly-centralized through successive
occupations by Spain, the United States, and Japan, followed by independence in 1946, and
the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos that ended after a peaceful revolution in 1986. Since the
1950s, various waves of decentralization have taken place to disperse the concentration of
power in Manila [22,23]. The largest wave culminated in the Local Government Code of 1991
[24] which introduced devolution to the entire archipelago in 1992, at that time considered as
the most extensive decentralization in Asia [25]. With assistance from multi-lateral development organizations such as the World Bank, WHO, and USAID [22], the national government
transferred the responsibility for government health services and other non-health services
(e.g. agriculture) to Local Government Units (LGUs) across the archipelago [22–30]. Currently, the Philippines is organized into 17 regions for the purpose of coordination, although
real political power at local levels lies with the LGUs that number into 81 provinces, and the
1,490 municipalities and 145 cities that are geographically within these provinces. Provincial
governments maintain some oversight over municipalities and less-urbanized cities, while
highly-urbanized cities are completely independent. Devolution disrupted the administrative
structure of government health services from what used to be a service under a singular
national ministry called the Department of Health (DOH), which previously managed an
intact district health system at local levels, into a fragmented service under the control of individual LGUs: provinces responsible for hospitals; municipalities responsible for primary care
facilities called Rural Health Units (RHUs); and cities responsible for both levels of care (Fig
1). Concepts such as “Interlocal Health Zones” [23] and “Service Delivery Networks” have
been introduced by the national government to restore interlinking by fostering a network of
health facilities and providers in contiguous areas, despite these facilities being under different
LGUs, to offer a package of health services in an integrated and coordinated manner.
In the peer-reviewed literature, studies reported how devolution in the Philippines failed to
enhance community participation in some municipalities [25] and sustained corruption when
politicians became the center of decision-making [22] due to what has been described as “elite
capture” [31] wherein existing power structures persist despite decentralization, compounded
by a lack of accountability measures. In some provinces, inefficiency emerged as a problem
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Fig 1. Simplified overview of the administrative structure of government health facilities in the Philippines before and after
devolution.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.g001

when these took on more hospitals than what provincial resources could handle [22,26,28]. In
some municipalities, patients learned to cross borders in search for better care [26], while a
quality assurance program launched by the national government in 1998 failed to improve
quality in primary care centers owned by the municipalities [32]. In the aspect of financing,
municipalities, unlike the wealthier cities, continued to rely on the income from the national
government for health spending [26]. Moreover, the lack of readiness at local levels prompted
the national government to provide a training program in management for local decisionmakers [30], and to deploy centrally-hired health professionals to municipalities that have no
resources to hire them [33]. One paper on the malaria control program described poor implementation at local levels due to dysfunctional linking with the national level [27].
Consequently, we should then ask: What conditions enable decentralization to produce
well-functioning health systems? [6]. We have explored this question by analyzing the perspectives of decision-makers at different levels of the Philippine health system. This is timely not
only because of the 25 years of experience of implementing devolution in the Philippines, but
also because of current initiatives in the country to change the structure of government from a
republican into a federal state [34], indeed a step even further than devolution that will significantly alter how health services will be governed in the country. Lessons from the Philippines
can offer policy-relevant insights [29] for countries that have decentralized or are contemplating to adopt some form of decentralization for their health systems.

Methods
Semi-structured questionnaire
A semi-structured questionnaire (S1 File) was developed by drawing from the decision space
approach and the concept of health sector functions [13], as well as from two studies in
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Pakistan that analyzed the synergies between decision space, capacity, and accountability
[18,19]. The questionnaire provided latitude in exploring participants’ insights and probed
their perspectives on and personal experiences in implementing devolution. We examined
their flexibility in making decisions within selected health sector functions. These functions
were broad categories of tasks where decision-makers make choices for the health sector as
previously reported in the studies by Bossert [13,14,18,19]. Drawing from these studies, we initially identified these functions as: 1) planning; 2) health budgeting and financing; 3) human
resources for health management; and 4) service delivery.

Participant selection
We purposively-selected and contacted (via phone calls and emails) decision-makers who
were serving the government health sector in positions of authority. Broadly, they represented
three groups of decision-makers: 1) ministers and directors from the DOH who served at
national and regional levels; 2) provincial, city, and municipal health officers, or those who
served as career health officers at local levels; and 3) provincial governors, city mayors, and
municipal mayors, or politicians who were elected to head the LGUs at local levels.

Data collection
The questionnaire was pilot-tested with two potential participants to check for clarity of the
questions prior to use. One of the authors (HJL) with training in qualitative research conducted interviews face-to-face with each participant in his/her preferred venue in the Philippines between January and April 2017. HJL is also a Filipino citizen who is familiar with the
country’s health system mostly through his work as an academic researcher and who was not
employed in the government health service sector. Each interview was audio-recorded and
manually transcribed in English. Transcripts were reviewed at least twice to ensure accuracy
and subsequently loaded into MAXQDA Standard 12 (VERBI GmbH Berlin, 1995–2017) for
coding and analysis.

Framework method
Analysis was based on the “Framework Method” as previously described in three papers [35–
37]. It is considered a systematic approach to thematic analysis that compares and contrasts
perspectives. Our approach to analysis combined both deductive and inductive approaches
and is summarized as follows: 1) constant familiarization with the data through repeated listening to the audio-recordings while simultaneously reading the transcripts; 2) open coding of
the transcripts that identified a preliminary set of categories based on the decision space and
the health sector functions; 3) development of an initial analytical framework comprised of
these codes and categories being identified from the transcripts; 4) coding of the rest of the
transcripts using this analytical framework with continuing iteration whenever new categories
were identified; and 5) analysis through comparison of emerging themes across categories,
individual interviews, and groups of decision-makers with the use of tables.
Final thematic analysis focused on interpreting: 1) how decision space was exercised by the
decision-makers in various health sector functions; 2) whether decision space was seen as
wide, moderate, or narrow within each health sector function; and 3) the conditions that make
decentralization effective for the health sector in the performance of these functions. We
defined a condition as any factor or process (including any potential interaction between
these) that has an enabling role in achieving a well-functioning decentralized or devolved
health system. Similarly, we also identified those conditions that work in the opposite (i.e. hindering condition). We then summarized these enabling and hindering conditions in a table
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organized according to health sector functions, together with the decision space within these
functions (using blue color coding) across groups of decision-makers. Finally, through an iterative process we synthesized the content of this table into a conceptual diagram, which was
inspired by the image of decentralization and centralization previously described in the literature as movements between two opposite poles [2].

Ethics statement
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the conduct of the interviews. The study protocol was reviewed and approved in Switzerland by the Ethikkommission
Nordwest- und Zentralschweiz (no. 2016-00738) and in the Philippines by the National Ethics
Committee (no. 2016-013). Drafting of this paper was guided by the Consolidated Criteria for
Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ) [38].

Results
Profiles of the decision-makers
We contacted 33 potential participants and interviewed up to 29 decision-makers when saturation was assessed to have already been achieved [39]. The audio files of two interviews were
corrupted and subsequently excluded, which nevertheless did not change our judgment of saturation, resulting in a total of 27 interviews transcribed. Each interview lasted an average of
one hour and four minutes. The 27 decision-makers worked in a wide range of local settings
in the Philippines (Fig 2).
There were 17 (63%) males and 10 (37%) females, with an average of 23.6 years of working
in the Philippine government sector. At the time of the interviews, 10 (37%) were serving at
national and regional levels, 11 (41%) were career health officers at local levels, and six (22%)
were elected local officials. Many of them crossed different levels of government during the
span of their careers. For instance, nine served in the DOH in various capacities, three of
whom were once the Philippine Secretary of Health (i.e. Minister of Health). Among career
health officers at local levels were four provincial health officers, three city health officers, and
eight municipal health officers, four of whom were heads of their respective national associations of health officers. Among elected officials were three provincial governors, four municipal mayors, one city mayor, two congressmen, and one senator. We further characterized the
length of service of each of the 27 decision-makers in Fig 3.

Health sector functions
The various decision-making activities described by the participants during the interviews
led to an expansion of the initial list of health sector functions into five categories, namely: 1)
planning; 2) financing and budget allocation; 3) resource management (further divided into
“facilities, equipment, and supplies” and “human resources for health” or HRH); 4) program
implementation and service delivery; and 5) monitoring and data management.

Planning
Devolution empowered LGUs to create the Local Health Board (LHB), a multi-stakeholder
board chaired by the governor (in provinces) or mayor (in municipalities and cities) that
serves as a venue for discussing local health concerns [25]. To what extent the LHB contributes
to planning depends on whether it actually meets regularly, as the governor/mayor may choose
not to convene it at all, and the ability of members to advocate for the concerns of the sectors
they represent. After about 10 years since the introduction of devolution, the DOH instituted
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Fig 2. Present and previous areas of health sector-related work of the 27 decision-makers. Locations indicate assignments that were �3
years. (Map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0. Data by OpenStreetMap, under ODbL.).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.g002

the annual “Investment Plan for Health” (IPH) [40] to assist the LGUs in planning and to
restore some form of standard planning process. The IPH enables the DOH, through its
regional offices, to train the LGUs to develop their annual plans for health, which specify local
health needs and the resources from local and central levels to support these needs. Thus, the
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Fig 3. Durations of government service of the 27 decision-makers, the institutions they worked in, and their levels of decisionmaking. Selected events in the Philippine health sector are also indicated.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.g003

DOH has become actively involved in planning for local health services and is seen to have a
wide (dark blue) decision space in this function compared to local decision-makers whose
space may be described as moderate (blue) (Table 1). Conditions that enable decentralization
in planning to be more effective for the health system include a functional LHB that feeds into
the planning process, as well as opportunities for key decision-makers from central and local
levels to meet, negotiate, set priorities, and co-create the local plans together. On the other
hand, hindering conditions include a weak mechanism to monitor faithful execution of these
plans, and the lack of sustainability for these plans given the reality of elections in the Philippines where local elected officials may change every three years.
The following quote illustrates how planning has provided an opportunity for negotiation
between the central and local levels and why it needs to be more strategic:
“Parts of the plans will be funded by the national government. We work with governors and
mayors because the plans emerge from municipal and city levels and integrated at provincial
level. The governor presents the consolidated plan and have it approved by the DOH regional
office. That’s better because he’s the head of the province and will have ownership of the plan.
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Table 1. Decision space at central and local levels for the functions of planning and financing and budget allocation (dark blue: Wide decision space; blue: Moderate; light blue: Narrow). Enabling and hindering conditions are described.
Health sector
functions

Decision space

Selected questions:
Are you able to. . .

Central/Regional decisionmakers

Local decision-makers

Planning
• Develop your own
annual plans for
health services at
local levels?
• Involve stakeholders
in the planning
process?
• Implement what has
been stated in these
plans?

The DOH sets the national
objectives for health, provides the
templates for the annual plans
and organizes workshops to train
the LGUs in preparing their
“Investment Plan for Health”
(IPH), which will indicate the: 1)
local needs to be prioritized; and
2) resources (from central, local,
or other sources) to support these
needs. Although not legallybound to submit an IPH, LGUs
often participate in the IPH to
benefit from the process.

Health officer:
He/She prepares the IPH by
relying on technical assistance
from the DOH. Ideally, the
content of the IPH should reflect
the articulations of the “Local
Health Board” (LHB), composed
of stakeholder representatives
who meet regularly to discuss
health concerns in the locality.

Financing and
budget allocation
• Allocate the budget
needed to support
health services at
local levels?
• Create additional
sources of financing
to support these
health services?
• Spend the budget
according to what it
was intended for?

Most taxes are collected by the
central government, which then
allocates the budget at national
and local levels. Despite
devolution, the DOH share in the
government budget has increased
substantially in recent years. The
allotment that LGUs receive from
the central government is often
inadequate to support local
health services, but the creation
of PhilHealth, which administers
the national social health
insurance program, provided an
additional financing mechanism
to sustain local health services
through reimbursements of
services rendered.

Elected official:
The provincial governor or
municipal/city mayor has the
authority to convene the LHB and
to approve the final version of the
IPH. His/her support is essential
for the LHB to be functional and
for most of the IPH to be
implemented.
Health officer:
He/she proposes the annual
budget for hospitals or primary
care centers which may or may
not be approved by the governor/
mayor depending on availability
of funds. The health officer may
also decide on how to spend the
additional income from
PhilHealth reimbursements, but
subject to the guidelines set by
PhilHealth.
Elected Official:
The governor/mayor has the final
decision on how much to allocate
in the local budget for health
services, which may or may not be
increased depending on current
resources and priorities. He/she
may also interfere in the work of
his/her health officer and in the
utilization of the additional
income from PhilHealth
reimbursements.

Conditions
Enabling

Hindering

• A functional LHB that meets
regularly, and where
stakeholders actively
advocate on behalf of the
sectors they represent
• 1) DOH staff at regional
levels who are capable of
influencing the LGUs to plan
well; 2) local health officer
who is skilled in strategic
planning and able to work
well with his/her elected
official; 3) governor/mayor
who is supportive of the
plans; and 4) an opportunity
for these decision-makers to
meet, perform priority setting
together, and co-create the
plans

• Weak monitoring of the
implementation of plans
• Lack of an accountability
mechanism to incentivize
execution of plans and penalize
failure of implementation
• Lack of sustainability of plans
as local elected officials may
change every three years when
local elections are held (i.e. the
new governor/mayor who wins
may not support continuation
of previous plans)

• A high-income LGU (mostly
the cities) with several
sources of alternative
financing (e.g. taxes from
local businesses) that are
adequate to support local
health services
• A health officer and elected
official who are able to work
well together and agree on
allocating a substantial
portion of the local budget
for health services
• A well-funded DOH and
PhilHealth that is able to
augment the financial
inadequacy of low-income
LGUs

• A governor/mayor (or his/her
other subordinates) who
interferes in the work of his/her
health officer in allocating and
spending the budget for local
health services, often because of
political motivations
• Concentration of the
government budget at central
and regional levels without
substantially increasing the
allotment at local levels, where
most government health
services have already been
devolved

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.t001

But sometimes the plan is a wish list, for example, requesting the DOH to finance the fencing
of their hospital [laughs]. Planning should be strategic to address real needs and improve their
health system.”
(Director in the DOH central office, 28 years in government)

Financing and budget allocation
Most financing for health remained within the control of the national government, which
pools tax collection and allocates the revenue share of LGUs based on a formula that considers
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local population and land area. It was the consensus among decision-makers that the inadequate share received by the LGUs led to the chronic underfunding and deterioration of many
local health facilities especially in resource-poor provinces and municipalities that have little
capacity for locally-generated income. Local health services often competed with other nonhealth services in budget allocation, which relied on the approval of the governor or mayor.
In 1995, the Philippines created the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)
[41], a DOH-attached agency that manages the national social health insurance program
which is financed through premium contributions from enrolled members, most of whom
come from the formal sector. Through PhilHealth’s reimbursements for services rendered,
many local health facilities received additional financing to sustain operations. In financing
and budget allocation, decision space is therefore seen as wide (dark blue) for the central
level, and also wide (dark blue) for the local elected official who makes the decision on
budget allocations, but moderate (blue) for the local health officer who, in most cases, needs
the approval of the elected official when it comes to the local health budget. Enabling conditions include the institutional capacity of LGUs to raise revenues on their own, a well-funded
central agency able to augment the lack of financial resources at local levels, and effective collaboration between the local elected official and health officer to be able to agree on allocating
a substantial portion of the local budget in favor of health services. Hindering conditions
include the concentration of financial resources at central levels despite devolution, and budget
utilization that is driven mostly by political motivations [42] instead of genuine health needs.
The following quote illustrates an example of how central support helps the LGUs meet
their needs in terms of financing and budget allocation:
“I kept talking to the municipalities to fix their RHUs. Of course, they have their allotment
from taxes collected by the national government. But the important thing is for LGUs to
understand that their operations are sustainable. How? They spend PHP100,000 (USD2,000)
from their own budget to upgrade the RHU and have it accredited by PhilHealth as a maternal delivery unit. PhilHealth will pay PHP8,000 (USD160) for every delivery. How many
deliveries, 30 per month? They get back PHP240,000 (USD4,800) per month. And that’s just
for maternal health. The RHUs do many other things that PhilHealth will pay for.”
(Former Philippine secretary of health or “minister of health”)

Resource management
Despite devolution, the DOH continued to purchase the supplies needed for most public
health programs, and these supplies are given to the LGUs as augmentation for their health
facilities. In 2007, the DOH also initiated the “Health Facilities Enhancement Program”
(HFEP) which provided a mechanism for LGUs to request assistance in the construction or
upgrade of health facilities through funds from the national government. The DOH also established a national rural physician deployment program called “Doctors to the Barrios” [33] one
year after the introduction of devolution which enabled the national government to hire physicians who are then deployed as local health officers in resource-poor municipalities that lack
them. Deployment has since expanded to include nurses, midwives, medical technologists,
and dentists. Under this program, deployed HRH receive their salaries from the national government but perform their duties as local HRH serving the LGUs. In some LGUs that have
adequate resources to hire their own HRH, the governor or mayor has the supervisory authority over local HRH. Therefore, decision space for resource management overall is seen as wide
(dark blue) for the central level, while at local levels it is moderate (blue) in terms of managing

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809 November 5, 2018

10 / 20

Conditions that enable decentralization to improve the health system

facilities, equipment, and supplies. However, for HRH management at local levels, decision
space is seen as narrow (light blue) for the local health officer but wide (dark blue) for the local
elected official who, in practice, is in full control of the hiring and firing process (Table 2).
The following quote illustrates an example of how the devolution of HRH management led
to inadequate compensation for local HRH especially in resource-poor LGUs:
“Public health workers are at the mercy of the LGUs in terms of salaries and benefits. The
compensation enacted by the national government should also be given to local health workers. But the implementation of the standard salary rates is not the same across the country
because the LGUs always say that they are autonomous from the national government. So the
health workers in municipalities, cities, and provinces where the benefits are being given are
lucky. But the others who don’t get these benefits still need to lobby for their rights.”
(Municipal health officer in a low-income island, 16 years in government)
On the other hand, the following quote illustrates the continuing significant intervention of
the central government in providing for the various resources needed by the LGUs for better
service delivery at local levels:
“There is creeping re-centralization in infrastructure, equipment, and human resource. The
DOH also procures all commodities for most of the major public health programs. TB drugs
and vaccines are entirely procured by the DOH and given to the LGUs, and the LGUs no longer need to buy anything. What else is devolved there? If you would look at the Philippine
national health accounts, LGU expenditures for health are going down while the budget of the
DOH is getting higher.”
(Philippine undersecretary of health or “deputy minister,” 28 years in government)
Some of the enabling conditions include: a governor or mayor who considers local health
services as an important component of his/her administration and is supportive of the needs
of local HRH; a local health officer who has good management skills, refrains from partisan
politics, and is actively involved in the association of health officers who are able to use their
influence as a group to assert their rights and privileges; and a DOH and PhilHealth with adequate resources to augment resource needs at local levels. On the other hand, one hindering
condition, particularly in areas that host deployed HRH as augmentation for their lack of staff,
is the potential tension between the local mayor, who is the head of the LGU, and the deployed
HRH, who is technically an employee of the DOH. In such a situation, conflict sometimes
arises because of the ambivalence in the lines of authority when the agency responsible for
managing the decentralized service is different from the agency providing the salary of the
staff tasked to deliver that service. Other hindering conditions include: weakened leverage in
negotiating prices of supplies and equipment when devolution obliged LGUs to negotiate individually with suppliers in procuring what is needed at local levels; weak accountability for
LGUs when these do not provide the full range of salaries and benefits that local HRH legally
deserve; and the lack of a stepladder for local health officers to pursue their career aspirations
as the devolved structure limits their opportunities for promotion within the LGU where they
are employed.

Program implementation and service delivery
Devolution provided opportunities for LGUs to develop and implement local health programs
that address their own unique needs, especially in settings with a culturally-sensitive context or
where access to care is geographically-challenging. However, most LGUs still continued to rely
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Table 2. Decision space at central and local levels for the functions of resource management, further classified into facilities, equipment, and supplies and human
resources for health (dark blue: Wide decision space; blue: Moderate; light blue: Narrow). Enabling and hindering conditions are described.
Health sector functions
Selected questions:
Are you able to. . .

Decision space
Central/Regional decision-makers Local decision-makers

Conditions
Enabling

Hindering

• A health officer (a physician as
prescribed by the law) who has
adequate skills for effectively
managing health facilities and
programs and is innovative in
finding ways to improve service
provision (e.g. public-private
partnerships for service
delivery)
• A governor/mayor who sees
the hospital or RHU as an
important component of his/
her term of office that affects
his/her chances of re-election
• A well-funded DOH and
PhilHealth able to augment the
needs for facilities, equipment,
and supplies by the LGUs, as
well as the additional
compensation needed for local
HRH

• Loss of leverage in bulk
procurement as LGUs have to
negotiate individually with
suppliers to procure equipment
and supplies potentially at higher
prices
• Less autonomy for some local
hospitals after these were
transferred to LGUs, and hospital
administrative matters combined
with other non-health services
which all go through the
bureaucracy in provincial
governments (leading to reduced
efficiency)
• In some cases, poor coordination
between the DOH and the LGUs
in the provision of augmentation
that may result in construction of
incomplete health facilities, or
facilities that have a faulty design,
or equipment/medicines delivered
to LGUs that do not match what is
actually needed

• Local health officers who are
non-partisan during local
elections and, thus, insulate
themselves from possible
political harassment whenever
there is a change in the
governor/mayor
• Strongly-united associations of
local health officers that have
the leverage to engage the
DOH, PhilHealth, and elected
local officials to assert their
rights and privileges
• A governor/mayor who values
the important role played by
HRH and thus promotes their
rights and privileges
• Adequate capacities at central
level to hire additional HRH to
be deployed to meet the needs
at local levels, and also to
augment the compensation of
local HRH already hired by
LGUs unable to provide their
full salaries

• Inclusion of local health services,
which is labor-intensive, into
auditing regulations that limit
hiring of personnel
• Weak accountability for LGUs that
do not provide the full
compensation and benefits that
local HRH legally deserve
• Lack of a seamless career
stepladder for local health officers
whose careers are mostly confined
within the LGUs that hire them
(unlike in a centralized system
where they may be seamlessly
promoted to positions at regional
or national levels)
• In some cases, tension between the
DOH and the LGUs for control
over health officers who are
invited to participate in capacity
building initiatives provided by the
DOH but who are administratively
under the LGUs that control their
ability to participate

Resource management
Facilities, equipment, and
supplies
• Put up the appropriate
types of health facilities in
the areas where these are
needed?
• Maintain and upgrade
these facilities?
• Provide adequate
equipment and supplies,
including medicines, for
these facilities to meet the
needs of the population
you serve?

The DOH maintains tertiary care
hospitals in every region and
highly-specialized hospitals in the
capital where patients from local
health facilities can be referred for
further management. The DOH
and PhilHealth also have the
regulatory power of licensing and
accreditation, respectively, which
ensures quality in health facilities.
In 2007, the DOH established the
“Health Facilities Enhancement
Program” (HFEP) where resources
from central levels are channeled
towards the construction or
upgrade of local health facilities
(including equipment) owned by
the LGUs. The DOH also
continues to purchase supplies for
many public health programs (e.g.
vaccines, TB drugs, iron
supplements for pregnant women,
contraceptives, etc.). PhilHealth
has also provided guidelines
instructing LGUs to spend their
PhilHealth income only for healthrelated expenses.

Health officer:
He/She manages the hospitals (in
provinces and cities) or the
RHUs (in municipalities and
cities). However, his/her success
in maintaining these facilities
relies largely on the budget
approved by the governor/
mayor. The HFEP provides an
opportunity to address this gap.

Human resources for
health (HRH)
• Hire (or fire) the
appropriate types and
number of HRH which
your local population
requires?
• Compensate HRH
commensurate to their
workload and according
to national standard
rates?
• Build the capacity of these
personnel and support
their career development?

The DOH established deployment
programs where the national
government hires physicians,
nurses, midwives, dentists, and
medical technologists who are
deployed to serve in local health
facilities owned by LGUs that lack
the capacity to hire them. The
DOH is also a major capacity
building provider for local health
officers who are invited to
participate in regular training
activities for implementing public
health programs. PhilHealth has
also required that a portion of its
reimbursements to LGUs be used
as additional compensation for
local HRH.

Health officer:
Despite a law that standardized
the salaries and benefits for
HRH, some local health officers
receive a lower compensation
compared to others due to the
lack of funds available for salaries
especially in resource-poor
LGUs. The differences in
compensation has been identified
as a cause of low morale among
affected health officers. In some
cases, health officers may also be
unjustly sidelined or placed on
probation by a newly-elected
governor/mayor who wishes to
place somebody else in the
position.

Elected official:
The quality of local health
facilities often reflects how much
the governor/mayor prioritizes
health. For example, the
governor may view provincial
and district hospitals as an
unnecessary burden that
provincial resources could not
maintain and thus should be
returned to the management of
the DOH.

Elected official:
The governor/mayor makes the
decision in hiring and firing. In
some cases, hiring is based not
on qualifications but on political
patronage. Moreover, hiring of
additional HRH to meet the
demands of an increasing
population is not always possible
because of a limit imposed by the
government’s auditing body on
the proportion of the local
budget that can be used for
salaries. This cap has resulted in
the hiring of many contractual
HRH without security of tenure.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.t002

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809 November 5, 2018

12 / 20

Conditions that enable decentralization to improve the health system

Table 3. Decision space at central and local levels for the functions of program implementation and service delivery and monitoring and data management (dark
blue: Wide decision space; blue: Moderate; light blue: Narrow). Enabling and hindering conditions are described.
Health sector functions

Decision space

Selected questions:
Are you able to. . .

Central/Regional decisionmakers

Local decision-makers

Program implementation
and service delivery
• Implement health
programs that are
mandated by the
national government?
• Provide your own unique
health programs or
services that address local
priorities and consider
the local context?
• Provide local health
services that meet the
standards for quality?

The DOH sets the national
policies, technical guidelines,
and standards for service
delivery. For example, the
overall strategic plans for many
disease control programs (e.g.
TB, malaria, noncommunicable diseases, etc.)
are determined by the DOH at
the central level and cascaded
down to the LGUs through its
regional offices. Most of the
health programs implemented
at local levels are DOHdetermined programs.

Health officer:
Depending on his/her capacity
for innovation, the health officer
may conceptualize and
implement unique programs
that address local health needs.

Monitoring and data
management
• Choose the indicators for
monitoring the
performance of the
health system at local
levels?
• Collect these indicators
in an accurate and
timely manner?
• Perform data
management efficiently
and electronically?

The DOH monitors a list of
indicators through the “Field
Health Service Information
System” (FHSIS) which is
published annually, although
often 2–3 years delayed due to
the difficulty of completing the
data coming from local levels.
Efforts have been initiated at
central levels to make data
management more efficient by
making LGUs adopt electronic
tools for data collection and
submission to the DOH.

Elected official:
Depending on his/her interest in
health, the governor/mayor may
or may not be actively-involved
in the implementation of health
programs. Nevertheless, his/her
support is critical for successful
implementation of any program.

Health officer:
He/she is responsible for
ensuring that all relevant health
indicators requested by the
DOH are collected by his/her
staff and submitted to the DOH,
which compiles the data. There
is, however, no strict penalty for
late submission of reports, or for
submission of inaccurate data.
Elected official:
The governor/mayor is often
not involved in monitoring and
data management and fully
delegates this function to his/her
health officer.

Conditions
Enabling

Hindering

• Opportunities for innovation in
service delivery that consider,
for instance, the cultural
sensitivities of particular
communities, or the
challenging landscape that
affects access to care
• Strong leadership by the DOH
to provide technical assistance
to the LGUs for implementing
national public health programs
and in dealing with health
issues that are beyond the
capacity of these LGUs (e.g.
protocols during outbreaks or
health emergencies, guidelines
for introducing a new vaccine,
etc.)

• Weak mechanism for
ensuring that program
implementation at local levels
is faithful to the standards set
at the central level
• Weak interlinking for
resource-sharing and
seamless patient referrals
between local health facilities
owned by different LGUs but
located in the same
catchment area

• Standardization at central levels
of a list of relevant health
indicators for strict collection at
local levels
• Availability of electronic tools
for performing monitoring and
data management more
efficiently

• Fragmented data monitoring
and management system with
weak central control for
timely collection of accurate
data at local levels
• Use of multiple electronic
tools for data collection by
different LGUs, resulting in
lack of harmonization of data
transmission for
consolidation at the central
level

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.t003

on the DOH for technical assistance in the implementation of many public health programs
(e.g. Expanded Program on Immunization, Family Planning Program, TB Control Program,
Environmental Health Program, etc.), which are determined and planned at the national or
central level and cascaded down through the DOH regional offices for implementation by
the LGUs at local levels. Moreover, health facilities located in the same area may have limited
means of effective cooperation between one another when these facilities are owned by different LGUs and only artificially linked through informal networks. In this context, decision
space is viewed as wide (dark blue) for the central level and moderate (blue) at local levels for
both the health officer and the elected official (Table 3).
The quote below illustrates an example from one province on how devolution has allowed
the LGU to deliver health services that are suitable to the local context:
“We are indigenous peoples, and we have practices that are culturally-appropriate but may
be frowned upon at the national level. While we advocate for facility-based deliveries, in geographically-isolated areas, mothers deliver in the house. When I was mayor, we provided
training for the husbands because, in our culture, the person who delivers, aside from the
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midwife, is the traditional village birth attendant or the husband. So at least there is basic
training for the husbands. That was our innovation. We also designed our local hospitals so
that there are areas where the patient’s family can stay to have an atmosphere like home.”
(Former provincial governor and municipal mayor, 26 years in government)
Enabling conditions for decentralization to be effective include opportunities for innovation for local decision-makers to improve service delivery, as well as strong leadership on the
part of central decision-makers to provide continuing technical guidance to the local levels for
program implementation. Hindering conditions include a weak mechanism to ensure fidelity
of program implementation at local levels [27], and weak interlinking between local health
facilities owned by different LGUs but nevertheless located in the same catchment area, which
has reduced opportunities for resource-sharing and a seamless patient referral scheme.

Monitoring and data management
The Field Health Services Information System (FHSIS) [43], which is managed by the DOH,
contains the official health data of the Philippine government. With devolution, the seamless
flow of data from local levels to regional and central levels to complete the FHSIS has become
more challenging, especially with the loss of direct administration by the DOH over data
reporting by LGUs. Nevertheless, efforts have been initiated to help facilitate data management
by promoting the use of different electronic tools for data transmission from local levels. Thus,
decision space for monitoring and data management for the central level is seen as moderate
(blue), while decision space is wide (dark blue) for the health officer who controls data collection at local levels and narrow (light blue) for the elected official who has little involvement in
performing this function.
The following quote is an illustration of how devolution has made it more difficult to harmonize the collection and pooling of health-related data at the national/central level:
“We try to publish the FHSIS final report every year. We are having a bit of difficulty, especially in some areas, in collecting the data. But with all the support that we are providing to
the LGUs, it is easier to make them obey and submit their reports to us. Previously, we tried eFHSIS and we gave computers to the LGUs, but they were not able to encode the data, and
there were problems with connectivity. The final FHSIS report is usually 2–3 years delayed
because it takes a long time to collect the data from all these LGUs.”
(DOH regional director, 34 years in government)
The conditions that either enable or hinder decentralization to improve the health system
are several, and our exploration of decision-making within the five health sector functions
provided a more organized way of capturing these conditions. Using the image of decentralization and centralization as a movement between two opposite poles [2], we have further synthesized these conditions in a conceptual diagram that mapped where these conditions should be
considered in terms of performing the functions, and in terms of decision-making at central
and at local levels (Fig 4). In this figure, we have also included some of the conditions in the
broader context where decentralization is placed based on the experience in the Philippines.
Some of these contextual conditions include an enabling political environment and a law that
makes decentralization difficult to reverse, the supporting role played by multi-lateral/bilateral
development organizations that provide technical assistance in implementing devolution, and
the increasing population which, particularly in the Philippines, calls for a more efficient delivery of health care at local levels.
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Fig 4. A conceptual diagram inspired by the image of decentralization and centralization as movements between two
opposite poles. Various conditions to be considered for decentralization to be effective in improving the health system are
proposed.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809.g004

Conditions related to the performance of the decentralized functions include clarity of roles
for the various decision-makers in the system, a sense of ownership for the decisions they
make, and the transfer of sufficient resources to support performance of these functions at
local levels. Conditions at local levels include adequate capacities which, at the individual level,
should include priority setting, innovation, systems thinking, and evidence-informed public
health. Lastly, conditions at central levels include the ability to enforce an effective accountability mechanism, and to recover some of the advantages of centralization, such as in pooling of
funds for more efficient financing, gaining leverage through bulk procurement of supplies on
behalf of local health facilities nationwide, central augmentation of the needs at local levels
especially to ensure equity, and enhancing cooperation between local health facilities in the
same locality. The experience of health sector devolution in the Philippines suggests that
decentralization can be implemented in policy but, in practice, some forms of re-centralization
take place to make up for the inadequacies at local levels that took on the functions. Thus, one
of the challenges in devolving the health sector is identifying the right combination of decentralized and centralized functions, even as the health system remains broadly decentralized, in
order to achieve optimal health system performance.

Discussion
This paper aimed to determine the conditions that potentially make decentralization effective
in improving the health system by analyzing the experience of devolving government health
services in the Philippines. Our analysis of qualitative data has allowed us to explore the variety
of factors and processes in the system, which we have called conditions, that play a role in
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enabling (or hindering) the effectiveness of decentralization. Rather than quantify these conditions through the calculation of composite indices, we have instead shown the feasibility of
obtaining a more nuanced and contextualized understanding of decision-making when these
conditions play out in particular situations, which also provides specific opportunities for policy interventions. For example, rather than make a general statement that accountability is
weak in the health sector function of planning, the qualitative approach has allowed us to
explore practical ways to improve decision-making in this function. One concrete policy intervention for the Philippines is the monitoring of the execution of these plans when the central
level provides incentives to LGUs for satisfactory accomplishment and imposes penalties for
failure in implementation.
The experience of devolution in the Philippines is consistent with the idea that decision
space is closely linked to the concept of control. Widening decision space in practice means
that control over health services is granted to one group of decision-makers over another. At
local levels, decision-making in most functions is concentrated with the elected local official, a
politician who may or may not be supportive of public health goals, rather than the local health
officer (almost always a physician) who holds the technical and administrative competence for
health services. The politicization of health has been blamed by all decision-makers in this
study as a hindering condition commonly experienced across most health sector functions,
often in the function of managing HRH. How to address an issue as serious as this in the Philippines is not easy as politics is unavoidable in healthcare, although some approaches have
been described by the decision-makers themselves that include, for example: building the
capacity of the local elected official to understand that health must be a priority; ensuring that
the local health officer refrains from partisan local politics; and making the national government (i.e. DOH and PhilHealth) use its leverage over LGUs to promote the rights and privileges of local HRH.
Furthermore, granting the decision space in favor of decision-makers at local levels through
decentralization or devolution does not necessarily imply that it is best for the central level to
relinquish entirely its control over decision-making. The goal, rather, is to identify the optimal
combination of decentralized and centralized functions. Some of the recent studies, such as
the one on Fiji [16], have argued that the failure to reap the full benefits of decentralization for
the health sector was in part due to the lack of a completely wide decision space at local levels
in spite of decentralization in policy. Similar observations on this lack of decision space at local
levels despite decentralization has been noted in the management of county health facilities in
Kenya [44,45], or the control over HRH by district heath managers in Uganda [17], or most of
the health sector functions in selected districts in India [15]. In the case of the Philippines
where local decision-makers are ill-prepared or lack the capacity to fulfill their health sector
functions well, having some wide decision space for the central decision-maker may actually
be a sign that the central level is intervening in ways that assist the local levels. Our analysis
indicates that, with the exception of high-income LGUs (e.g. in highly-urbanized cities), many
health sector functions in the Philippines are performed by local decision-makers with significant augmentation from the central level, without which the health system would most likely
have been in a worse situation. Thus, contemplating decentralization for the health sector in
any setting should seriously consider the readiness of the lower levels of administration to
assume the new functions, as well as analyze the evolving role that the central level (e.g. Ministry of Health, or DOH and PhilHealth in the Philippines) has to play as it learns to implement
decentralization and shepherds the health system as a whole. Certainly, some form of coordination must be maintained at the central level no matter how extensive the form of decentralization [46], and some tradeoffs must be negotiated for clarity of roles among decision-makers
at different levels of the health system [47]. The Philippines is an example of how the central

PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206809 November 5, 2018

16 / 20

Conditions that enable decentralization to improve the health system

level could use its regulatory power and the augmentation it provides as leverage to build
capacities at local levels and also make them accountable for their decisions.

Conclusions
In summary, several conditions that enable or hinder the effectiveness of decentralization for
the health sector have been described in this paper by analyzing the perspectives on decisionmaking in five functions. For planning, these conditions include a multi-stakeholder approach,
being strategic, and monitoring execution. For financing and budget allocation, these include
capacities to raise revenues for health services at local levels, more evidence-informed and less
politically-motivated funding decisions, and effective central pooling of funds for augmenting
financing needs at local levels. For resource management, these include having a central level
capable of providing resource needs at local levels by using the leverage in bulk procurement
and deploying the HRH needed in areas that lack them, as well as having a good working relationship between the local health officer and the elected official. For program implementation
and service delivery, these include promoting innovation at local levels while the central level
ensures fidelity to national objectives and likewise promotes cooperation among local health
facilities. Finally, for monitoring and data management, these include the central level being
capable of ensuring that data collection from local levels is performed in a timely and accurate
manner despite the system remaining devolved. One important condition is the role maintained by the central decision-maker especially in assisting local levels unable to perform their
functions well. It will be useful for policy to explore the optimal balance of decentralized and
centralized functions, even as the system remains decentralized overall, and focus on the conditions that have to be in place in order for decentralization to be effective in improving the
health system.
The experience of devolution in the Philippines highlights the reality that decentralization
is a long and complex journey and not an automatic solution for enhancing health system performance. Particularly for the Philippines, this means that current initiatives to expand decentralization even further by changing the structure of government from a republican into a
federal form must be very carefully re-examined, especially in terms of how such a change
would, once again, impact the effectiveness of health service delivery at local levels. Our findings also provide an opportunity for comparison with the experience in other countries that
have adopted decentralization and assess similarities (or differences) in lessons learned. Any
country that contemplates whatever form of decentralization for its health sector must recognize that the presumed benefits do not happen overnight, and that expectations must be tempered by the challenges of implementing it on the ground.
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